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The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or
Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio*
Having the opportunity to deliver the John H. Tucker Lecture is
indeed an honor. Although I did not know Colonel Tucker
personally, I was quite aware, from the time that I was a law student,
of his many contributions to the advancement of the civil law in
Louisiana. When Professor Litvinoff called me to extend the
invitation to be the Tucker lecturer, I wondered what I could possibly
offer to such a knowledgeable and distinguished group of civil law
scholars. As I sat in my office contemplating this question, one of my
students came in and introduced herself as the daughter of a former
student whom I had taught in 1976, my first year of teaching at
Loyola Law School. It struck me that I was actually beginning to
teach another generation of lawyers about the law of successions in
Louisiana. I thought about what a different course it would be for the
daughter than it had been for her mother twenty-five years before. I
also pondered whether I would be around for another twenty-five
years to teach another generation and what in the world that course
would be like.
Tonight I want to share with you some of my thoughts regarding
those questions and ultimately, regarding the civil law in Louisiana
as we begin the twenty-first century. Rather than attempt to speak to
the "system" of law in Louisiana, which Professor John Merryman
defined as the "operating set of legal institutions, procedures and
rules,"' I will more accurately address the civil law "tradition" in the
state; that is, the "set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society
and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal
system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected, and taught."2 I suspect that some of you will disagree with
some of my conclusions; my hope is that all of you will not disagree
with all of them and that a portion of what is said this evening will
enure to the benefit of the civil law tradition of our state. As I
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1. John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 1 (2d ed. 1969).
2. Id. at 2.
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consider Professor Merryman's definition of legal tradition and think
about the changes in Louisiana over the last quarter century, I am sad
as I recount some of the revisions that lead me to believe we have
indeed lost some of that proud tradition of Roman origin that links
rights with responsibilities, where "the individual is more often
envisioned in a social context."-3 We have amended our Louisiana
Civil Code sometimes to the point where it can no longer claim to
possess what Jean-Louis Baudoin notes as the essential traits of a
civil code, which are "simplicity and internal coherence."4 Too often,
we have deviated from a methodology where a problem is approached
first by looking to the Code for general principles, then to doctrine for
explanation of those principles, and only later to prior cases for a
view as to how they were interpreted in the past.5 We have at times
discarded an original code article and have replaced it with a more
"modem" version, noting in the official comment that there is "no
change in the law," only to realize later that the change in language
did effect a substantive change.6
3. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State Law and
Family in the United States and Western Europe 298 (1989). Glendon recounts
that:
In continental law, rights tend to be seen as naturally paired with
responsibilities. The individual is more often envisioned in a
social context. There also seems to be more recognition in the
Roman-Germanic systems that law, along with other social forces,
can contribute in its own small but not insignificant way to the
construction of the world of meaning with which beliefs, feelings,
and attitudes are formed.
Id. See also Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 La. L. Rev. 301,
310 (1998):
In my judgment, the principles of mutual respect and cooperation
for the common good underlie the entire Civil Code. I think of
them as being the essence of what Justinian meant by his first
precept of the law, honeste vivere, or live honorably. Indeed, I
believe they should be seen as including the remaining two of
Justinian's precepts, alterum non laedere and suum cuique
tribuere, or harm no one and give everyone his own (of his
share?).
Id.
4. Jean-Louis Baudoin, Reflexions sur la codification comme mode
d'expression de la regle de droit, in Unification and Comparative Law in Theory
and Practice 17 (1984), quoted in Shael Herman, The Fate and The Future of
Codification in America, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 407, 411 n.22 (1996).
5. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System: Louisiana and Comparative Law
96 (2d. ed., 1999) [hereinafter "Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System"] (stating that
".... in civil law countries judges and lawyers alike start their judicial reasoning
from statutes as embodying general principles capable of covering any
conceivable fact situation." Id.).
6. See La. Civ. Code art. 1474 (1991), as amended by 1991 La. Acts 363, §
1 which requires that an unborn be in utero at the time of the testator's death in
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Agreeing that Louisiana is truly a mixed jurisdiction,7 possessing
qualities of both the common and civil law traditions,' I address my
comments this evening to the retention and enhancement of the civil
law portion of that mixture, as it so directly affects the private law
and lives of our citizenry.
I. ARCHAIC OR PROPHETIC?
Is what remains in Louisiana of the civil law tradition, archaic or
prophetic? Are the concepts mutually exclusive or are there aspects
of the archaic that render it classic and thus appropriate for
prophesying what lies ahead? The word archaic, derived from the
Greek word ap(oaiKo; (archaikos) is defined as "relating to,
belonging to, or having characteristics of an earlier or often more
primitive time;" synonyms are "old-fashioned" and "antiquated." 9 An
initial contemporary response might be that if the tradition is archaic,
we should discard it since anything old-fashioned is not worth
keeping. Yet, as we contemplate the state of the American family
today, we may wonder if some of the older ways might be preferable
to today's trends, where over one-half of marriages end in divorce"°
and twenty-eight percent of children under the age of eighteen live
with only one parent," usually the mother,"2 and often in poverty. 3
order to be capable of receiving a donation mortis causa. Previous La. Civ. Code
art. 1473 (1870) required only that the donee "exist" at the opening of the
succession of the testator. Similarly, La. Civ. Code art. 953 (1870) required an heir
"exist" at the moment that the succession becomes open and La. Civ. Code art. 957
(1870) provided that two things must be proved in order to vest the child with the
right of inheriting, i.e. that the child be conceived at the moment of the opening of
the succession and that the child be born alive. None of the earlier articles required
actual implantation in utero. For a discussion as to the distinction and its relevance
to assisted reproductive technologies, see Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle
to Tomb: Estate Planning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 La. L. Rev.
27, 49-50 (1996).
7. See Palmer, supra note 8, at 26; Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed
Jurisdiction 4 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1999); T.B Smith, The Preservation
of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed Jurisdictions," in Civil Law in the Modem
World 3, 4 (A. N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965).
8. See Joachim Zekoll, The Louisiana Private Law System: The Best ofBoth
Worlds, 10 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L. F. 1, 29 (1995) (concluding that "Louisiana stands
as an example of a jurisdiction which has successfully chosen the best of both
worlds, by adopting commercially sound rules without compromising its civilian
heritage." Id.). See also William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil
Law Codified and Uncodified, 60 La. L. Rev. 677 (2000).
9. Webster's New International Unabridged Dictionary 111 (3d ed. 1961).
10. U.S. Divorce Statistics, Divorce Magazine.Com: Help for Generation Ex,
available at http://www.divorcemagazine.com/statistics/statsUS.shtml (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
11. Id. In 1998, 20 million (28%) of children under the age of eighteen lived
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Prophetic, from the Greek ;rpo0qruo, (prophetikos) is defined
as "foretelling events; tending to indicate what is going to happen.
1 4
It connotes looking into the future and perhaps offering new promise.
If indeed prophetic, will our civil law tradition be our entrge to yet
unknown or undiscovered possibilities that lie ahead? Will it
shepherd us into an international arena where our legal heritage will
provide us an advantage for communicating with others around the
world?
This questioning of the efficacy of our civil law tradition is not
new and can be traced back to discussions following the Louisiana
Purchase. Having been under both French 5 and Spanish 6 rule prior
to this time, the new territory was deeply rooted in the civil law
tradition. When Congress divided the Louisiana territory into two
parts, the new Territory of Orleans essentially became the State of
Louisiana.' 7 Subsequently, the first Legislative Council of the
territory met in 1806 and proposed that the Territory of Orleans be
governed by the Roman and Spanish laws in effect at the time of the
Louisiana Purchase." The veto of this act by Governor Claiborne 9
marks the first official questioning of the wisdom of retaining the
civil law tradition in Louisiana.20 In protest to the Governor's veto,
with just one parent. Id.
12. Id. In 1998, eighty-four percent of children in a single family home lived
with their mother alone. Id.
13. Id. In 1998, forty-one percent of the children living with only their mother
lived in households with incomes of less than $12,500. Id.
14. Webster's, supra note 13 at 1818.
15. The charter granted by Louis XIV to Antoine Crozat to develop Louisiana
provided that royal proclamations and the Custom of Paris were the law in the new
territory. John H. Wigmore, Louisiana: The Story of its Legal System, 1 So. L.Q.
1,2 (1916); Shael Herman, et al., The Louisiana Civil Code: A Humanist Appraisal
21 (1981); Henry Plauch6 Dart, The Legal Institutions of Louisiana, 3 So. L.Q. 247,
249 (1918); A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in La. Civ. Code
XLV (West 2002) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, Civil Code].
16. Shortly after the territory was ceded to Spain, a new Spanish Governor Don
Alexander O'Reilly replaced the French law with the laws of Spain. A.N.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 60; John T. Hood, The History and Development of
the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 7 (1958); Rodolfo Batiza, The Unity
of Private Law in Louisiana under the Spanish Rule, 4 Inter-Amer. L. Rev. 139,
140-41 (1962); Wigmore, supra note 19, at 3; Herman, supra note 19, at 21.
17. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System, supra note 5, at 63; Wigmore, supra note
19, at 5; Herman, supra note 19, at 22; Hood, supra note 20, at 7.
18. Yiannopoulos, Civil Code, supra note 19, at XLVIII; Herman supra note
19, at 22; Hood, supra note 20, at 11.
19. Yiannopoulos, Civil Code, supra note 19, at XLVIII; Herman supra note
19, at 22; Hood, supra note 20, at 11.
20. Professor Yiannopoulos points out the "pragmatic considerations" which
surely contributed to Governor Claiborne's decision. See Yiannopoulos, Civil
Code, supra note 19, at XLVIII.
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the Legislative Council adjourned. Following the publication of a
manifesto a few days later, expressing strong support for the civil law,
the legislature reconvened on June 7, 1806, and authorized James
Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet to draft a civil code for the
territory." The Governor acquiesced and the Digest of 1808 came
into being,22 followed by the Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870.
While the civil law tradition prevailed, it was not long before its
efficacy was challenged. Critics from the halls of academe and from
the chambers of judges began to question the true civil law nature of
the law in Louisiana in the early 1900s." A major challenge came in
the form of a "reappraisal" of Louisiana's civil law system which
appeared in an article by Professor Gordon Ireland in the Tulane Law
Review in 1937.24 Alleging adoption of the common law concept of
stare decisis,25 citing areas of the law which had clearly adopted the
common law tradition,26 and lamenting the "notorious"declining use
of the French language,27 Professor Ireland made a case for his
conclusion that "Louisiana is today a common law State., 2' He noted
that each of the law schools of the state offered "three times as many
courses on common law subjects as it offers on the Code or civil
law ' 29 and claimed that "[a]ll instruction is given by the case
method. 30
The reaction by civil law enthusiasts to these accusations was
adamant3' and included a collaborative effort by four giants of the
21. Yiannopoulos, Civil Code, supra note 19, at XLVIII; Herman, supra note
19, at 24; Hood, supra note 20, at 12.
22. The Digest of 1808, entitled "A Digest of the Civil Laws now in Force in
the Territory of Orleans, with Alterations and Amendments Adapted to its Present
Form of Government," was adopted on March 31, 1808. Yiannopoulos Civil Code,
supra note 19, at IL; Herman, supra note 19, at 24; Hood, supra note 20, at 13.
23. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 Tul L.
Rev. 830, 980 (1979) (observing that Professor Charles Payne Fenner (Professor
of Civil Law at Tulane University), noted that much of our jurisprudence was
common law. Id. at 833) (citing Charles Payne Fenner, The Jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in The Celebration of the Centenary of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, 133 La. lxi, lxv (1913) quoting Judge Pierre Crabites'
comments to the effect that Louisiana had lost its civil law character, as cited in
Crabites, Louisiana Not a Civil Law State, 9 Loy. L.J. 51 (1928)).
24. G. Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 585
(1937).
25. Professor Ireland concluded that "[t]he civil law method in which the judge
yields to the text has here completely given way to the common law method in
which the text yields to the judge." Id. at 592.
26. Id. at 592-95.
27. Id. at 595.
28. Id. at 596.
29. Id. at 595.
30. Id.
31. See Leonard Greenburg, Must Louisiana Resign to the Common Law? 11
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civil law, Harriet Spiller Daggett, Joseph Dainow, Paul M. Hebert,
and Henry George McMahon to refute the conclusion reached by
Professor Ireland.32 A number of significant points were made by
these scholars, which could easily be made today to educate those
who marginalize the significance of the civil law tradition in
Louisiana. First, as previously noted, the parameters of the civil law
are limited to areas of private law and do not extend to public law,
commercial law, or penal law. 3 Second, granted that Louisiana has
borrowed heavily from the common law, it has not rejected the civil
law tradition.34 Third, the analysis of case law in Louisiana does not
equate to adoption of the common law concept of stare decisis, where
a single case dictates the outcome of a later dispute, but may be
perfectly consistent with the doctrine of jurisprudence constante,
where a case may be used to discern a pattern that may aid in
interpretation.
Despite their defense of the civil law tradition in Louisiana, the
law professors acknowledged "many deficiencies of civil law
education in Louisiana,' 36 but optimistically anticipating additional
financial support, predicted a brighter future on the horizon for the
civil law tradition.37 The "wake-up" call provided by Professor
Ireland served to galvanize other civil law advocates as well. Dean
Paul M. Hebert of the Louisiana State University Law School and
John H. Tucker, Jr. who wrote the enabling act for the creation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute in 1938, were among the leaders of the
movement to strengthen the civil law tradition in this state. The
purpose of the Louisiana State Law Institute, as stated in the statute
creating it, was "to promote and encourage the clarification and
simplification of the law of Louisiana and its better adaptation to
present social needs; to secure the better administration ofjustice and
to carry on scholarly legal research and scientific legal work.' 3 In
1948, the legislature charged the Institute to prepare a projet for the
Tul. L. Rev. 598 (1937); RL. Tullis, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 12
Tul. L. Rev. 113 (1937).
32. Daggett, supra note 9, at 12.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 16-24.
36. Id. at 38.
37. The authors advocated financial support for creation of teaching materials
and adequate facilities for the preparation and printing of doctrinal materials. Id.
at 39-40.
38. La. R.S. 24:204 (1989). The Law Institute was created by Act No. 166 of
1938. See 1938 La. Acts 166. Colonel John Tucker was the first elected president
of the Institute. See T. Hailer Jackson, Jr., John Tucker and the Law Institute, 45
La. L. Rev. 999 (1985).
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revision of the Louisiana Civil Code.39 In 1960, the Civil Law
Section of the Institute was formed with the mission of promoting
civil law studies and revising the Civil Code.4' The promotion of
civil law studies, which would in turn provide necessary doctrinal
writings, was implemented by the creation with West Publishin
Company in 1965 of the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise series.
Additionally, to promote the reading of doctrinal sources, as
knowledge of the French language became less common, 42 the
Institute sponsored translations of numerous French writers, such as
Planiol,43 Geny," and Aubry and Rau.45 In 1967, the Institute for
Civil Law Studies was chartered by the Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University to promote research in the civil law.46
With all these developments to support his thesis, Justice Mack
Barham, in a 1972 article in the Louisiana Law Review, proclaimed
a veritable "renaissance" of the civil law in Louisiana. 47 The judiciary
contributed to this reawakening with supportive law review articles
and scholarly opinions,4" reflecting the civil law identity.
As we begin another century, perhaps another reappraisal is in
order. Has the civil law tradition in Louisiana slowly faded away?
Are we clinging hopelessly to a moribund ideal? Or are we
embarking on an era when another revival is on the horizon? I
choose to analyze these queries in the context of two topics, the time-
honored institution of forced heirship and the recent developments
associated with assisted means of reproduction. Each speaks to the
core concepts of family and, I submit, that the civil law tradition
offers the best alternative for dealing with these two, rather
controversial, subjects.
39. 1948 La. Acts 166.
40. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System: Coursebook 60 (1977).
41. Id.
42. See generally, Alain A. Levasseur & Roger K. Ward, 300 Years and
Counting: The French Influence on the Louisiana Legal System, 46 La. B.J. 301
(1998).
43. Marcel Planiol & George Rippart, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil (La.
St. L. Inst. trans., 1959).
44. Francious Geny, Mithode d'interpritation et sources en droit privi postif:
Critical Essay (Jayo Mayda trans., 1963).
45. C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais (Carlos E. Lazarus trans. 1969).
46. Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance ofthe Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33
La. L. Rev. 357 (1972).
47. Id.
48. See Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian
Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 La. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1988) (pointing out support to civil law "revival" given by Justices John Dixon,
Pascal Calogero, and James Dennis after the "initial impetus" provided by Justices
Mack Barham and Albert Tate).
2002]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
II. FORCED HEIRSHIP-A PILLAR OF THE PAST
Forced heirship, the civil law concept which guarantees certain
heirs a portion of a decedent's estate was once considered almost
sacred in Louisiana and was protected from abolition by both the
Louisiana Constitutions of 192 19 and 1974.5o Yet, ironically, shortly
after the beginning of the "renaissance" of the civil law in Louisiana
in the 1970s, forced heirship came under attack as being outmoded,
being a "primitive kind of socialism," "unsound in theory and...
unsound in practice."'" Louisiana defenders of the institution, such
as Thomas B. Lemann eloquently replied:
Certainly times have changed, but it does not follow that all
ancient institutions are ipso facto obsolete. Are the Ten
Commandments outmoded? They may be violated, but
society still considers them worthy goals. Is the family
archaic? Some indeed think so, but most do not. Parents still
have a moral and civic duty to their children...."
Outside observers such as Professor Mary Ann Glendon were actually
recommending that other jurisdictions consider adoption of this
institution which offered "great promise for approaching some of the
most challenging contemporary family law problems," brought on
by our changing society characterized by "serial polygamy." 5 Yet,
despite the support, forced heirship was fighting a losing battle. Even
the revisions, developed in a spirit of compromise during the 1980s
to render the institution more palatable to its critics,55 failed to save
the doomed institution.56
49. La. Const. Art. IV, § 16 (1921).
50. La. Const. Art. 12, § 5 (1974).
51. Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced
Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1977).
52. See Thomas B. Lemann, In Defense ofForced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 20,
24 (1977). See also Cynthia Samuel et al., Developments in the Law 1993-94:
Successions and Donations, What Has Become ofForced Heirship? 45 La. L. Rev.
578(1984).
53. Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 19 80's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553
(1984).
54. See Mary Ann Glendon, State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition
in the United States and Western Europe 247 (1977).
55. These revisions included the elimination of parents as forced heirs (1979
La. Acts 778, § 1 & 1981 La. Acts 442), a decrease in the amount of the forced
portion (La. Civ. Code. art. 1493 amended by 1981 La. Acts 884, § 1) and the
diminishing of the forced portion by declaration of unworthiness or disinherison.
(La. Civ. Code art. 1498 amended by 1981 La. Acts. 645, §1).
56. For an account of the many changes, redefinitions, and indeed restructuring
of this institution, see K. Lorio, The Changing Face of Forced Heirship: A New
Louisiana Creation, in Louisiana, A Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction (Vernon
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Unfortunately, the very fact that it was part of the civil law
tradition made forced heirship an easy target for criticism. Since
Louisiana law was different from that of the other forty-nine states,
it could be attacked as somehow out-of-step, parochial, and
backward." Actually, the opponents to the institution could have
cared less about the historical origins of forced heirship. Rather,
they reflected a trend in Western legal thought that is endemic to
both civil and common law nations, i.e., that the individual and his
desires are paramount or as stated by Alain Benabent:
Instead of the individual belonging to the family, it is the
family which is coming to be at the service of the individual.
The permanent place of the family among our institutions is
retained, but not for the same reason. No longer is it
because the family serves society, but because it is a means
for the fullest development of the individual. When it no
longer fulfils its role, the bonds diminish and disappear.5"
"Free testation," "individual liberty," and "it's mine and I should be
able to do with it as I please" became the mantra of those opposing
forced heirship. 9 This attitude was buttressed by surveys which,
not surprisingly, indicated that most testators did prefer to make
choices without limitations from the state and those choices favored
the surviving spouse over the children.6' Certainly, the results of the
1995 popular vote approving the constitutional amendment which
altered forced heirship so fundamentally, whether fully understood
or not," supported the argument that this is what the people desired.
Palmer ed., 1999).
57. See Gerald Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29,
40 (1977) (noting that "[t]hose who oppose forced heirship in general take
considerable delight in poking fun at exaggerated situations that seem to run
contrary to common sense." Id.).
58. Alain Benabent, La liberte individuelle et le marriage, 1973 Revue
trimestrielle du droit civil 440, 495 cited in Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 58, at
292-93.
59. Nathan, supra note 55, at 6 (stating"... my approach to this issue is not
altogether negative, in the sense that I oppose forced heirship: it is also positive in
that I strongly favor freedom of testation. A testator should have the right, subject
to appropriate limitation as to public policy and morality to dispose of his property
as he pleases." Id.).
60. Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 58, at 242 (noting a Bar Foundation survey
conducted in 1978 in which the surviving spouse was clearly the preferred legatee).
61. James Welsh, Heirship in Louisiana: A Trust of Wills, The Times-Picayune
(New Orleans), Oct. 31, 1995 Fl (quoting Carole Neff as saying, "... [m]any voters
were voting on the basis of misconception at what this change in the law will
accomplish... Forced heirship has not been eliminated by the law." Id.).
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Yet, despite the fact that I have been termed a "Diehard ' '62 when
it comes to forced heirship, an appellation I must say I am proud to
hold, and that I continue to "mourn" the loss of a useful institution
which offered protection to children of first families marred by
divorce,63 my purpose tonight is not to revisit the battle of forced
heirship. Rather, it is to commend our civil law methodology for
providing our state with a way to salvage some degree of order after
the significant alteration of a time-honored concept that was so
intricately woven into the fabric of our civil law. Once a
constitutional amendment was passed by the people of this state,
which withdrew the protection for forced heirship as originally
contemplated by the Code;" that is, one protecting all children from
disinheritance, regardless of age or infirmity, a major overhaul of
Civil Code provisions dealing with forced heirship was essential.
Anticipating the approval of the constitutional amendment, the
legislature had passed the summer before the vote on the
constitutional amendment, an implementation act to take effect
contingent on the passage of the amendment.65 Ambiguities in that
act and confusion over its application abounded.66 Had all the
potential controversies been left to the courts for resolution on a
piecemeal basis, estate planning in this state would have been a
quagmire of unpredictability. Thus, despite strong opposition to the
"new" forced heirship by some, most would agree that a methodical,
studied approach as to how to integrate this altered concept into the
laws of Louisiana was essential. The Louisiana State Law Institute,
a body which had never voted approval of the abolition of forced
heirship, 67 advised the legislature of the critical need for such an
62. See Max Nathan, Forced Heirship: The Unheralded "New" Disinherison
Rules, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 n.15 (2000).
63. See Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An
Alternative from British Columbia, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 1, 5 (citing Jeffery P.
Rosenfeld, Disinheritance and Will Contests, in Family Systems and Inheritance
Patterns 186, table 8.4 (Judith N. Cates & Marvin B. Sussman, eds., 1982) that
stepchildren and second spouses bring one-third of will contests).
64. On October 21, 1995, the voters of Louisiana approved an amendment to
Article XII, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution which provided:
To abolish forced heirship, except to require forced heirship for
children twenty-three years of age or younger and to authorize the
legislature to classify as forced heirs children of any age who are
incapable of taking care of their person or estate due to mental
incapacity or physical infirmity.
Thus, protection of all children from disinheritance, regardless of age or infirmity,
was no longer to be a part of Louisiana law.
65. 1995 La. Acts 1180.
66. For a discussion of some of the problems with this legislation, see K. Lorio,
The Citadel has Fallen-Or Has It?, 44 La. B.J. 16, 17 (1996).
67. A vote recommending the abolition of forced heirship was never passed by
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approach6" and provided the vehicle for revision. With strongly held
opinions on both sides of the issue as to the wisdom of abolishing
forced heirship, members of the Louisiana State Law Institute
deliberated, often in heated debate, as to the best way to implement
the constitutional amendment approved by the people of this state.
Working to address the questions raised by the confusing
implementation act, the Institute examined the entire area of forced
heirship and offered a comprehensive treatment that anticipated
potential problem areas.
Lest I sound too rosy in my painting of the picture, I must note that
the product is not perfect. 69 It was not accompanied by a thorough
exposition of the law, but was somewhat hurriedly prompted by the
passage of the constitutional amendment which shook the very
foundation of forced heirship.70 However, despite the imperfection in
the end product, our civil law methodology was certainly the preferred
way to deal with the situation.
To illustrate the chaos and confusion when matters are not handled
in an orderly fashion, one need look no further than the law of collation,
a concept related to forced heirship, but one which basically assumes
that a parent wishes to treat all his children equally.7' To implement
this objective, all descendant forced heirs had the right under provisions
of the Code of 1870, to bring an action demanding that any earlier gifts
given to. the forced heirs by the decedent be considered as advances on
the final inheritance. This concept, being somewhat of a corollary to
forced heirship, could not function as originally contemplated once
healthy children over the age of twenty-four were eliminated as forced
heirs. If the concept of collation were to be retained within the context
of the "new" forced heirship, there would have to be some amendment
to the existing articles to assure that even non-forced heir children
the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
68. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable
"Revolution" Completed, 57 La. L. Rev. 55, 82 (1997) (quoting the Council of the
Law Institute in its plea to include forced heirship within the call of the First
Extraordinary Session of 1996).
69. Some argue that once the major restructuring of forced heirship was
mandated, a cohesive integration with other parts of the Code would be impossible.
Others criticize that the comprehensive revision went much further than the mandate
of the constitutional amendment to emasculate forced heirship. One example is the
three-year limitation put on donations inter vivos in order to include them in the
active mass of a decedent's estate for purposes of calculating the legitime. See La.
Civ. Code art. 1505, amended by 1996 La. Acts 77 § 1.
70. See Cynthia Ann Samuel, The1997 Successions and Donations Revision:
A Critique in Honor of A.N. Yiannopoulos, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1041, 1044-45 (1999).
71. For a comprehensive look at the history and current status of collation in
Louisiana, see Ronald Scalise, Jr., The Chaos and Confusion of Modern Collation:
A Critical Look into an Institution of Louisiana Succession Law, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 411(2000).
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would be subject to the demands of equality. Perhaps due to the
difficulty of conceiving such an amendment, or perhaps believing that
equality among children is an old fashioned aspiration, the Louisiana
State Law Institute, when making its recommendation for amendment
to the forced heirship provisions following the approval of the
constitutional amendment, made no suggestions for the co-ordination
of the concept with the new forced heirship provisions, but rather
recommended the repeal of collation altogether.' At the legislature,
the House accepted the recommendation of the Law Institute and
the Senate rejected it. A compromise was agreed upon in
Conference Committee, but, rather than send this complicated
matter back to the Law Institute to co-ordinate the recommended
compromise with other parts of the Code, an amendment was made
"on the spot," during the legislative session, to only one article of
the Code, 'permitting only forced heirs of the first degree who were
coming to the succession the right to demand collation. Without
amending the remaining sixty articles of the Civil Code dealing
with collation, a last sentence was added to the single amended
article to the effect that "any provision of the Civil Code to the
contrary is hereby repealed. ' '" 4 The chaos that has ensued has
elicited uniform negative criticism, 5 leading one scholar to
comment that "the present doctrine of collation apparently is at sea
with neither compass nor rudder."76 Such confusion could have
been, if not avoided, perhaps alleviated, if the matter had been
referred back to the Law Institute for proper integration into the
Code.
Thus once the decision was made to alter a basic civilian
concept, the best way to finesse such a major change in
72. 1996 First Extraordinary Session House Bill 55, codified in 1996 La. Acts.
77.
73. La. Civ. Code art.1235, amended by 1996 La. Acts 77.
74. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, supra note 72, at 128-29 (stating that the
"omnibus repealer in the second sentence that repeals provisions of the Civil Code
to the contrary can only pertain to these three items: . . . (1) who can demand
collation, (2) to what does collation apply, and (3) the value to be used." Id.).
75. See generally, Scalise, supra note 75; C. Samuel, Letter from Louisiana:
An ObituaryforForcedHeirship and Birth Announcementfor Covenant Marriage,
12 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 183, 188-89 (1997); Kerry J. Miller, Comment, The New
Forced Heirship Law, Its Implementing Legislation and Major Substantive Policy
Changes of the Louisiana State Law Institutes's Proposed Comprehensive
Revisions on the Successions and Donations Laws, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 223, 244-45
(1996); Spaht, supra note 72, at 133.
76. Fredrick Swaim & Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
on Succession and Donations 29 (West Supp. 2001). Although the author would
like to claim credit for this observation, the comment is vintage "Admiral" Swaim.
77. Rather than illustrating the "archaic," some might argue that the illustration
of forced heirship could more appropriately be categorized in the "prophetic"
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substantive civil law was through the use of civil law methodology,
allowing for the deliberative study and integration of the new
provisions into the Code. Additionally, despite fundamental
objections to the "new" forced heirship, even we "Diehards" may
be heartened by the fact that Louisiana remains proudly isolated
from all other states in its protection from disinheritance of
children, albeit only the young and disabled.7"
lIf. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION-AN ISSUE FOR THE FUTURE
In addition to adapting an ancient institution to contemporary
society, civil law methodology may also afford the superior process
for ushering in a coherent legal response to a relatively new
phenomenon-the rapidly developing world of assisted reproduc-
tive technology. In this complicated arena, couples who are trying
to create families, but need medical assistance to do so, are
ironically raising issues that threaten traditional definitions and
concepts of the family. As the number of people availing
themselves of these technologies escalate and as medical science
offers previously unthought-of scenarios for doing so, the legal
issues will proliferate.
Statistics reveal that 6.1 million people in the United States, or
about 10% of all people of reproductive age are infertile.79
Although adoption may be an option, it is not as easy as in the past.
Partially due to the legalization of abortion and partially to the
removal of the stigma of single motherhood, there are fewer
category. See T. Lernann, supra note 56, at 20 in which he states:
.. [florced heirship is more than a law, it is an institution. We
tinker with such institutions at our peril. There are already too
many forces tending toward disintegration of the family, the
central and most important unit of our society. Social
considerations, as well as the wisdom of the ages, suggest that
forced heirship has not outlived it usefulness.
Id.
78. See the following which commend Louisiana for its uniqueness and social
utility: Brian C. Brennan, Disinheritance of Dependent Children: Why Isn 't
America Fulfilling its Moral Obligation?, 14 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 125 (1999);
Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Childfrom Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone?, 57 La. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Deborah A. Batts, IDidn 'tAsk to be Born: The
American Law Of Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of
Protected Inheritance, 41 Hastings L.J. 1197 (1990); Ronald Chester, Should
American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 Real Prop. Prob. &
Tr. J. 405 (1997).
79. FAQ: What Causes Infertility, Science Magazine available at
www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Feb. 24,2003). Infertility is defined
by the American Society ofReproductive Medicine as failure to conceived after one
year of unprotected intercourse. Id.
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children available for adoption. 0 An article in Science Magazine
in July, 1998 indicated that in the United States, only about 30,000
healthy infants are available for adoption each year.8 ' The same
article reports that about 60,000 babies are born each year with the
help of artificial insemination; 15,000 with the use of in vitro
fertilization, and at least 1,000 as a result of surrogacy
arrangements. 82
In 1992, Congress, in an effort to protect the consumers of this
modem technology, passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act requiring fertility clinics to submit reports annually
as to the number of assisted reproductive procedures conducted and
the success of those procedures.8 3 In the 1998 report, six clinics in
Louisiana submitted reports, indicating that 545 procedures were
performed in that year, resulting in the birth of 143 children.84
Although many of these births will raise no legal issues since the
couples availing themselves of the procedures were married and used
their own gametes, potential issues arise in situations involving the
use of donor gametes, the freezing of embryos, and fertilization after
the death of a partner.
There is very little guidance offered by our Civil Code as to how
to respond to these issues. I feel confident that Moreau-Lislet and his
contemporaries were not contemplating such problems when they
were drafting Code articles in the early 1800's. The biggest dilemma
at that time was determining who the father of a child might be, a
question that can be answered today with almost certainty due to
DNA testing. But the questions of this century are significantly
different as we ponder, "Who is the mother and how many mothers
can a child have?" The potential queries threaten the very essence of
our notion of family. Some issues were addressed in Louisiana as
they arose. In an effort to protect children conceived by means of
artificial insemination with the consent of the husband of the mother,
Civil Code article 188, dealing with disavowal of paternity, was
amended in 1976 to bar the husband from disavowing the resulting
child 5 born to his wife as a result of artificial insemination to which
80. Michael S. Serrill, Going Abroad to Find a Baby, Time Magazine, Oct. 21,
1991 at 86. In the United States, in 1966, sixty-five percent of babies born to single
women were placed for adoption. Twenty years later, only five percent were placed
for adoption. Id.
81. ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility
Techniques, 281 Science 651 (July 31, 1998).
82. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1994).
84. 1998 ART Clinic Section Report, Louisiana, available at http:
//apps.nccd.cdc.gov/art98/clinlist98.asp?State=LA (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
85. La. Civ. Code art. 188, amended by 1976 La. Acts 430, § 1.
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he agreed. Ten years later, a new chapter was added to the Civil Code
ancillaries to deal with legal issues involving human embryos created
by in vitro fertilization, including potential inheritance rights.86 In
1988, following the much publicized In re Baby M surrogacy case,87
in which a woman agreed for compensation to be artificially
inseminated, carry the resulting child to term, give birth, and then to
relinquish the child to the sperm donor and his wife, the Louisiana
legislature responded by passing an ancillary to the Civil Code
providing that surrogate motherhood contracts would be void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.88 In addition to these
generic responses, statutes have been passed to deal with individual
cases involving specific Louisiana citizens. A few years after the
passage of the statute declaring surrogate motherhood contracts to be
against public policy, a case involving gestational surrogacy elicited
the empathy of Louisiana legislators who passed a statute providing
that a child born to a gestational surrogate who carried and delivered
a relative's genetic child be given the name of the genetic mother and
her husband.89A later statute grants legitimate status to a child
conceived by a woman after her husband's death, using sperm which
the husband had specifically designated for that purpose.9
86. La. R.S. 9:121-133 (1991).
87. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
88. La. R.S. 9:2713 (1991) provides:
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be
absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary
to public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood " means any agreement
whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm
agrees for valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any
resulting fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor
of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the
child.
It should be noted that the definition seems to include only the case where a woman
is both the contributor of the egg and the carrier of the child, i.e. the biological
mother in the complete sense. Thus, it could be argued that the statute has no
application to gestational surrogacy arrangements.
89. See La. R.S. 40:32 (2001) (dealing with gestational surrogacy where the
"resulting fetus is carried and delivered by a surrogate birth parent who is a blood
relative of either the husband or wife") and La. R.S. 40:34 (2001) (regarding the
name to be placed on the birth certificate of such child).
90. See La. R.S. 9:391 (1991) which provides:
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of Civil Code Articles 184 and
185 to the contrary and in addition to the provisions of Civil
Code Article 179, any child conceived after the death of a
decedent, who specifically authorized in writing his surviving
spouse to use his gametes, shall be deemed the legitimate child
of such decedent, provided the child was born to the surviving
spouse, using the gametes of the decedent, within two years of
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How will all the reactions to assisted reproductive technologies
be co-ordinated? For example, does the Louisiana in vitro
fertilization law which prohibits the sale of human embryos, but
allows for their prenatal adoption, announce a policy to protect
fertilized embryos? If so, can we allow the embryos to remain frozen
for indefinite periods of time, cognizant that, after a certain period of
time, they will perish if not implanted?9 More troubling, if adoptive
parents are not readily available for these embryos, should artificial
wombs be considered a viable alternative?92 We can only imagine the
filiation and inheritance issues raised by these questions.
There are obvious difficulties in dealing with such issues in a
piecemeal fashion as an individual crisis arises. There is also,
understandably, a reluctance to tackle such a controversial subject
area. Yet, the technology advances, people continue to use it, and
legal problems will inevitably arise. In contemplating the potential
legal issues raised by these technologies, the Honorable Jean-Louis
Baudouin, at the last Tucker lecture,' warned that "[H]astily drafted
legislation, adopted in response to a particular crisis situation or
sudden political pressure usually makes bad law."' He advocated the
use of the civilian methodology with its logical deductive model, as
a means of approaching these legal issues.9 He wisely advised that in
order to have a cohesive, logical response, it is first necessary to
articulate some "fundamental principles" and then to be flexible in
applying them, leaving the judiciary to play a "creative role,"
interpreting the legislative intent in the context of the general precepts
articulated in the legislation.96
Concerned with the proper legal response to the questions raised
by assisted reproductive technologies, the Senate of the Louisiana
legislature in 1999 passed a resolution, creating a cross-disciplinary
task force to study the issues of assisted conception and to
the death of the decedent.
B. Any heir or legatee of the decedent whose interest in the
succession of the decedent will be reduced by the birth of a child
conceived as provided in Subsection A of this Section shall have
one year from the birth of such child within which to bring an
action to disavow paternity.
91. See Richard Jerome et al., Last Chance Family: Couples Plagued with
Infertility Find a New Path to Parenthood: Adopting Frozen Embryos, People
Magazine, Jan. 21, 2002, at 44-49.
92. See Julie Sevrens Lyons, Researchers Moving Closer to Creating Art-
ificial Wombs, Miami Herald, Feb. 24, 2002, at 18.
93. Jean-Louis Baudouin, Science, Ethics and Civil Law, 61 La. L. Rev. 423
(2001).
94. Id. at 429.
95. Id. at 430.
96. Id. at 430.
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recommend principles for the drafting of a legal response. 97 The goal
was to bring together doctors, lawyers, religious leaders, legislators,
geneticists, the fertile, and the infertile to discuss these issues and
recommend some general policies for the state. The actual drafting
of responsive legislation was most likely to be left to the Louisiana
State Law Institute, particularly with regard to issues of filiation and
inheritance. The Louisiana Task Force on Assisted Conception and
Artificial Means of Reproduction was created and held its first
meeting on April 25, 2000.98 Prior to any discussion of policies, three
preliminary matters needed to be addressed. First, since the matters
were of such a highly technical nature, a general educational session
was held to inform the group as to the procedures now being used in
this state and to discuss possible technologies on the horizon.99 The
next order of business was to discuss the charge of the task force and
to attempt to reach a consensus as to the goals of the group. At first
impression, this appeared to be a particularly formidable challenge.
As each member of the task force and each interested observer in
attendance introduced himself or herself (revealing particular
predilections, many in direct opposition to those of his fellow
panelist), I wondered whether this diverse group could even begin to
articulate a common general objective for these deliberations, let
alone agree on a comprehensive report. At that time, I was reminded
of the words of Professor Mary Ann Glendon in her prizewinning
book, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: "Whether meant to or
not, law, in addition to all the other things it does, tells stories about
the culture that helped to shape it and which it in turn helps to shape;
stories about who we are, where we came from and where we aregoing.""l°
In determining our goals, we inevitably would be painting a
picture of the kind of society we wished to perpetuate. Ultimately,
after some discussion, the task force members were able to agree that
the primary goal of our deliberations should be to afford legal
protection to the children born as a result of the use of assisted
reproductive technologies. Thus, despite the fact that some task force
members possessed extremely contradictory opinions as to the
propriety of the use of certain technologies, the members collectively
agreed that our state policy should reflect a compassion and concern
for the best interests of the innocent children. Third, the task force
97. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 141 of 1999, Regular Session.
98. At the initial meeting, Senator Don Hines was elected Chair and Professor
Kathryn Ventuatos Lorio was elected Vice-Chair of the Task Force.
99. On May 30, 2000, Dr. Bobby Webster oriented the Task Force on the
medical issues.
100. Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 8 (1987).
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was informed as to the work of the Marriage-Persons Committee of
the Louisiana Law Institute regarding the filiation of children."°'
Deliberations, limited basically to policy issues regarding filiation
and recognition of civil contracts, ensued, culminating in the
submission of both a majority and a minority report to the legislature.
Once the legislature has reviewed and decided upon its basic policy
approach, the recommendations will presumably be submitted to the
appropriate committees of the Louisiana State Law Institute for
drafting legislation. Then, particularly in an area of such controversy,
the steps advanced by Colonel Tucker as "important and essential" in
codification should be followed, i.e., careful preparation of a projet,
thorough discussion of the projet, adoption by the legislature and
post-codification development by doctrine and jurisprudence. °2
In these new areas of law, the approaches of French doctrine will
prove of little assistance. Rather, the law professors of this emerging
era, many of whom may still be in law school, will offer the aid
needed to work with the new laws and to co-ordinate them with old
laws. As predicted many years ago by Justice Albert Tate, "new
legislation often reflects principles different from those expressed by
older statutes, so that the meaning of former legislation must often be
reinterpreted constantly in the light of the principles expressed by the
newer enactments.',
10 3
The role of the judiciary in this endeavor to deal with new
technologies will be to start with articles in the Code and to apply
them directly where feasible. However, due to the rapid
developments in reproductive medical technology, such as cloning
and the development of artificial wombs, Code articles should not, by
necessity, be too specific, but rather should reflect general principles
which could be applied to later developing situations. As pointed out
by Justice James Dennis when he delivered the Tucker lecture a
decade ago, "the court must use the code as its source of guiding
values in formulating a rule for the situation, either by analogy or by
rulemaking. '' '°
If Justice Tate were here to guide us in dealing with these new
technologies, he would probably recommend the use of the
"objective" method of interpretation where "the meaning of the
application is determined in the light of the circumstances as they
101. Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht, Reporter of the Marriage-Persons
Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute addressed the group.
102. John H. Tucker, Jr., Tradition and Technique of Codification in the
Modern World. The Louisiana Experience, 25 La. L. Rev. 698 (1965).
103. Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques ofJudicialInterpretation in Louisiana, 22 La.
L. Rev. 727 (1962).
104. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application ofthe Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 13 (1992).
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exist at the time the interpretation takes place, perhaps many decades
after the enactment."' 5 The interpretation would also be "functional"
in the sense that the legislation would be applied to new situations
"by considering whether the legal precept was intended to regulate
that general type of conflict of interest and by considering the purpose
for which the statute was enacted."'0 6
Thus, the civil law tradition, substantively emphasizing the
interests of children and the preservation of the family, with a
methodology adaptable to constant change, offers a workable
framework for dealing with the legal issues that may arise in the
highly-technical area of assisted reproductive technology. This
controversial subject matter elicits precisely the formula which
Professor Pascal described as he defined a model Code, "a formal
consensus, to serve as a major premise," "expressed largely in
abstract terms," making it "usually easier to appreciate how they
[terms] apply to new unforeseen circumstances and conditions."10
IV. RECOMMITMENT TO THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
It was about thirty-five years after Professor Ireland's message
"rallied" Louisiana citizens to work toward the preservation of their
civil law tradition 0 8 that Justice Barham re-examined the civil law
tradition in Louisiana and proclaimed its "renaissance." Now, almost
thirty-years after that "renaissance," it may be timely to re-check the
pulse of that tradition and to recommit ourselves to its healthy
survival. At least two good reasons exist for such a course of action.
First, the civil law tradition is suited to the private law needs of
Louisiana. Second, by educating others as to our tradition, we
prepare for our inevitable transition into the global community that
will characterize the new millennium. Because Louisiana offers a
working mixed system to examine, the state affords students an
aspect of legal education that cannot be duplicated by the mere
105. Tate, supra note 107, at 732.
106. Id. at 733. Justice Tate warned that "[t]he judge must think of himself as
the legislators' colleague, not as a super-legislator; sometimes he merely echoes the
legislative rule, sometimes he completes or extends it so as to govern conflicts of
interest within its scope but not specifically provided for; and even when the judge
finds the formal working of the legislative rule does not furnish the legal principle
appropriate for decision of the instant case, he does so only in the spirit of
cooperation and of doing what he thinks is the intention of the legislation, not in a
spirit of opposition or dissent." Id. at 737.
107. Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana Civil Law and Its Study, 60 La. L. Rev. 1, 9
(1999).
108. See Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana 's Civilian
Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 La. L. Rev. 1, 4
(1988) (stating that "Ireland's challenge served to rally Louisiana citizens").
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offering of comparative courses in an Anglo-American jurisdiction.
In Louisiana, a student of the civil law deals with legal issues with a
greater degree of detail within the confines of a viable,° 9 functioning
system rather than being relegated to vague comparisons in a vacuum
of academic hypotheticals. The unique value of a Louisiana legal
education has not been ignored by the Louisiana law schools as they
compete for students in a market influenced by national rankings
based on LSAT scores and the number of faculty publications in top
twenty law reviews. At a time when the percentage of civil law, as
opposed to common law students, is decreasing in the law schools of
Louisiana,"0 the very existence of civil law programs may be
threatened unless they may be linked to a more expansive concept.
One answer to balancing the retention of the civil law tradition, while
keeping competitive in this new arena, is to capitalize on the civil law
tradition as a vehicle to the international and comparative arena.
Tulane Law School, which reports in its catalog that only fifteen
percent of its students come from Louisiana,"' proclaims that
"Everything old is new again." Pointing to its teaching of both civil
and common law courses for over 150 years, it posits, that "this
mingling of intellectual thought has evolved into a highly
sophisticated comparative and international law program that is
primed and ready for the complex legal issues of the 21 st century."" 2
Apparently what is "old" is the civil law tradition, but what may have
been viewed as archaic before is now new and prophetic of a modem
world view. Similarly, Loyola Law School, proudly states in its
bulletin that "[B]ecause it is located in Louisiana,... Loyola is one
of the few law schools in the world offering both curricula," civil law
and common law." 3 As a credential verifying exposure to both
traditions, Loyola offers a Certificate in Civil Law studies to its
common law students who complete a prescribed program of civil
law courses, two required of all certificate applicants, and a certain
109. My thanks to Professor Raphael Rabalais who made this observation in a
conversation on February 25, 2002.
110. Of the law schools in Louisiana offering both civil and common law
degrees, both Loyola and Tulane report a drop in the number of entering students
registered for the civil, as opposed to the common law, in 1998 as opposed to 2001.
Loyola indicated that in 1998, 54.23% of the entering students registered for the
civil law curriculum, as opposed to only 47.84% in 2001. (Statistics reported by
Shirlene Muckelroy, Loyola Law Records). The difference at Tulane was more
dramatic with 17.4% classified as civil law at entry level in 1998 and only 9.9% in
2001. (Statistics confirmed by Tulane University School of Law Dean's Office).
111. Tulane Law School catalog at 7.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Loyola University New Orleans, School of Law International Programs
Bulletin at 3.
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number to be chosen from a "pool" of designated courses." 4 A
similar offering is available to Civil Law Students who wish to as
well obtain a Certificate in Common Law Studies." 5 In addition, a
Certificate in International Legal Studies is available for those
"preparing for professional careers in the emerging global
economy.""'6 Effective in the Fall of 2002, Louisiana State
University Law Center, offers a "simultaneous conferring of a Juris
Doctor and Bachelor of Civil Law Degree, reflecting its "bijural"
tradition." 7 After completing a mandated first year curriculum
composed of civil and common law courses, the students in their
second and third years must complete designated hours of Civil law,
Common law, global law and public law courses from a "basket,"
rather than a "pool.""'  All of these programs are commendable and
can only expand the horizons of the students availing themselves of
them. However, lest we forget in our zeal for international
accommodation, the foundation upon which our Louisiana claim to
comparative, bijural, or mixed distinction rests, is that we offer a
living laboratory. It is that unique experience that prompted Professor
Mathias Reimann to recommend the recruitment of Louisiana civil
law scholars such as Professors Saul Litvinoff, A.N. Yiannopoulos,
and Symeon Symeonides to aid in the codification of private law for
the European Union, as he observed that "these scholars have gone
beyond just thinking about' codifying rules in mixed
jurisdictions-they have actually done it."' ' Thus, the teaching of
114. The courses of Civil Law Property and Civil Law of Obligations are
required of all certificates applicants. Additionally, the applicant must complete one
of the following courses, Civil Law of Persons, Successions, Donations and Trusts,
Sales and Leases, Community Property, or Security Rights. Loyola Law Bulletin,
2001-2002, at 30.
115. Required courses for the Common Law Certificate are Common Law
Property II and Commercial Transactions. Additionally, the students must complete
one of the following courses: Contracts II, Common Law Property I, Trusts and
Estates, or Secured Transactions. Id. at 30-31.
116. Id.at3l.
117. LSU Law Center Catalog, 2001-2002, at 5.
118. Id. at 14.
119. Mathias Reimann, Towards a European Civil Code: Why Continental
Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1337, 1346
(1999). Professor Reimann compliments Louisiana's doctrinal writers and the
Louisiana State Law Institute, with specificity, stating:
Illustrations of how civilians in the mixed jurisdictions have
worked toward the goal ofbringing civil and common law together
are not hard to find; Louisiana can provide some examples.
Codifiers in the bayou state have always worked comparatively.
Leading representatives are Athanassios Yiannopoulos mainly in
property law, Saul Litvinoff in obligations, and, more recently,
Symeon Symeonides in conflict of laws. In drafting and revising
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the civil law tradition within the Louisiana context of its Civil Code,
doctrinal writings, and jurisprudence must be nurtured in order to
foster the environment which distinguishes our law schools from
those functioning under only one system and merely offering
comparative and international courses with no laboratory component
for actual experimentation.
Some of the alleged obstacles to the strengthening of the civil law
tradition remain, long after the critique of Professor Ireland in 1937.
One is that the fluency in the French language has diminished over
the last sixty-five years. 20 Fewer of our students are bilingual, and
of the few who are, their second language is usually not French.
Although scholars in the past would deem the civil law tradition in
Louisiana doomed due to this situation, 2' two developments offer an
alternate prediction. First, translations of many of the French
doctrinal writers are readily available. Additionally, with the revision
of the Civil Code, those writings are less relevant than they were in
the past.' This may explain the interesting finding that in court
decisions of the past ten years dealing with forced heirship, modem
doctrinal writers, contemporary professors teaching civil law courses,
were cited at least twice as often as French doctrinal sources.'
Doctrinal interpretation of codal provisions remains today an
essential component of the civil law tradition.'24 In order to continue
rules, they and others have constantly considered concepts, rules,
and approaches from various civil- and common-lawjurisdictions.
The Louisiana Law Institute, home of much of their work, has
become a veritable powerhouse of comparative legislative
drafting.
Id.
120. See Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal
Education: A Requiem, 57 La. L. Rev. 1283 (1997).
121. See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law
(Codified and Uncodifed), 60 La. L. Rev. 677, 729 (2000) in which Professor
Tetley concludes "the difficulty which the civilian tradition experiences in surviving
and developing in Louisiana is directly proportional to the constantly declining use
of the French language in that state." See also Roger K. Ward, The French
Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 La. L. Rev. 1283
(1997).
122. See Palmer, supra note 8, at 43 in which Professor Palmer that, "[F]or
better or worse, and it is difficult to decide which, a state of linguistic independence
seems within reach."
123. Since March 14, 1992, in cases dealing with forced heirship, Louisiana
federal and state courts cited Aubry and Rau a total of three times; Planiol, five
times; Nathan, six times; Samuel, eight times; Spaht, twenty times, and Swaim and
Lorio, eight times each.
124. See Albert H. Tate, Jr., Techniques ofJudicial Interpretation in Louisiana,
22 La. L. Rev. 727, 739-40 (1962) in which Justice Tate quotes approvingly of
Planiol's observation as to legal doctrine, stating that "its role is considerable; it
gives orientation; it prepares from afar many changes in legislation and in case
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such scholarship, the law schools must actively encourage, support,
and certainly not marginalize the work of the Louisiana scholars,
despite the fact that the top twenty law reviews will most likely not
choose to publish the commentary. 2 ' Otherwise, touting our civil
law laboratory, the very foundation upon which our claim to a unique
position bridging two legal systems is based, becomes mere rhetoric.
To support these endeavors, the law schools as well as institutions
such as the Louisiana State Law Institute and the Center for Civil Law
Studies should dedicate resources to the continued development of
these doctrinal materials and also to the creation of teaching materials
especially designed for our "microcosm of a mixed jurisdiction," '126
as national publishers understandably show little interest in
publishing materials for such a limited market.
The perpetuation of any tradition mandates that it constantly be
replenished. Thus, as I start to teach my second generation of
Louisiana law students, our law schools should be searching for those
who will begin to teach their first generation. The candidates should
reflect a sincere interest in preserving and nourishing, through legal
scholarship and teaching, that precious civil law tradition which is
clearly distinguishable from mere generic state legislation. Similarly,
the Louisiana State Law Institute should be seeking out new members
with outstanding credentials, from diverse backgrounds, who will
help to draft legislation reflective of a consensual, deliberative body.
Pursuant to the By-Laws of the Institute, the Council should review
its membership annually, determining which members are eligible for
law... [By it,] scientific principles and juridic ideas are developed and come to
dominate the thought of judges and of the legislator himself." Id. See also 1
Planiol, Civil Law Treatise supra note 47, § 127.
Writing in 1962, Justice Tate also noted that due to the French language
impediment, doctrine had played a "relatively small part" in the development of
Louisiana's law, but in the two decades preceding his writing he saw a "great
increase in Louisiana doctrinal writing," partially due to translations of French
materials, but also because of the treatises in English of Louisiana scholars. Id. at
740-41.
125. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Law Reviews: A Foray Through a Strange
World, 47 Emory L.J. 659 (1998). Professional Zimmermann notes that doctrinal
scholarship, which he defines as "the analysis of legal problems in a manner
conducive to facilitating the practical application of the law" is viewed with "a
certain amount of condescension or even disdain at the elite universities." Id. at
689. Professor Zimmermann also notes that comparative law in general "plays the
role only of an outsider." Id. at 690. And also that rankings of law reviews are
based on the "frequency of citation." Id. at 692.
Since only a limited audience has an interest in, or need to consult, the
Louisiana civil law doctrine, it is logical that Louisiana doctrinal writing would
pose little interest to the top twenty law reviews.
126. Term used by Vernon Palmer. See Palmer, supra note 8.
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Senior Officer status and elevate such individuals.2 7 This would not
only serve to honor members who have devoted years to the Institute,
but it would also allow for the election of additional members, to the
Council who could work and learn with the experienced seniors,
offering fresh insight to the deliberations and preparing themselves
for future leadership within the Institute. The constant renewal would
serve to enhance the credibility of the Institute, which must be
cautiously mindful of the constituency it serves in this state, and
would also provide the seeds for future leadership to insure the
continued viability of the Institute.
In conclusion, our challenge, while revising the Civil Code and
while providing completely new sections to deal with contemporary
technology, will be to modernize, without discarding the classic
ideology and methodology which is characteristic of our proud civil
law heritage. If we truly wish to preserve our legal tradition, whether
for its own sake or as a springboard to international aspirations, it is
127. See By-Laws of the Louisiana State Law Institute, adopted Nov. 13, 1998:
IV. Council of the Institute
B. Membership, § 4 provides "All members of the Council
and all Administrative and Non-Administrative Officers
of the Institute shall have the privileges of the floor and
the right to vote at all Council meetings."
VI. Officers of the Institute
N. The Council may elect as Chairperson Emeriti those
persons who have served as Chairpersons of the Institute.
0. The Council may elect as Senior Officers attorneys who
have served not less than sixteen years in the Louisiana
Legislature and not less than four years as members of
the Council, members who have served not less than
twelve years as members of the Council, members of the
Council who are elected to the judiciary after having
served not less than eight years as members of the
Council, and members of the judiciary who have served
no less than eight years as ex-officio members of the
Council. The Coordinator of Program and Research,
Civil Law Section, and the Secretary, Civil Law section,
are Senior Officers during their terms of office as officers
of the Civil Law Section.
Q. Chairpersons Emeriti and Senior Officers, as non-
administrative officers, shall have the status, rights, and
privileges of officers, shall have tenure for life, and shall
perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the
Council.
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incumbent on us to take the initiative to reinforce its foundation
within our state. I am hopeful that we will succeed in this endeavor
and that we will retain our civil law tradition which has served us
well for so long. Hopefully, if I am blessed to be teaching in another
quarter century, I will enter my classroom at that time and instruct a
third generation of law students of Louisiana in our revered civil law
tradition.

